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Abstract and Summary 
Deep precision strike is a generic military operation that depends 
importantly on C4/ISR system contributions. Information from the 
latter is realistically subject to chance influences: targets are found and 
correctly identified generally at rates proportional to their numbers, 
locations, and activities, and to the coverage of shooter-serving 
sensors; the events of detection are realistically random, as are the 
delays, results, outcomes, and follow-up of the targeting shooters. In 
this paper a simplified version of the above complicated process is 
analyzed mathematically, here as a multi-stage queuing process with 
imperfect service. The probabilistic outcomes can be used to anticipate 
the results of higher-resolution simulations; these often are far more 
time consuming both to set up and run. 
Aspects of the above queuing situations can also be deduced via a 
deterministic "fluid" queuing approximation that gives an adequate 
and convenient representation of aspects of the state variables and 
various Measures of Effectiveness in the stochastic queuing model. 
Relying on that agreement, we have elsewhere generalized the 
stochastic queuing model setup to fluid models that incorporate 
omitted realities, such as losses from target-list tracking, and the 
inevitable time dependencies, non-stationarities, and adaptive 
behaviors that typically occur in actual military operations or 
vignettes. Both the stochastic and deterministic model results are 
informative and produce reasonable insights. Further validation steps 
using mathematical probability techniques as well as simulation are 
planned; some are in progress. 
It is ironic, but of interest and potential value, that strong 
abstract correspondence exists between the deep, precision strike 
situation described and for which our models have been formulated, 
and certain disaster relief scenarios. In these, the deep-strike targets 
are identified as disaster victims (human, or infrastructure), the 
CUISR sensor assets are discovery-medical diagnosis and triage 
systems, and the deep-strike weaponry ("shooters") is replaced by 
suppliers of medical service. In both cases time sensitivity and 
uncertainty exacerbate the decision problems. Force composition and 
structure questions translate into very similar questions and issues 
for these two important topics of modern military concern. This is an 
argument for the cost-effectiveness of pursuing an abstract model 
type that has a range of applications and provides broad insights. 
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0. Overview 
Battle damage assessment (BDA) is an aspect of “hard” battlespace 
information war (IW)/information operations (10) that promises to add to the 
efficiency of combat engagements. In spite of the precision of modern weaponry 
and sensor/communication system, shots fired at targets will occasionally miss 
(or cause only partial damage). Consequently a sequence of several shots may be 
directed at a particular (hostile) target to increase the probability of kill. This 
paper examines the efficacy of a shooting strategy that depends upon 
information: that of shoot-look-shoot. 
In the shoot-look-shoot tactic the targeter (Blue) fires once at an acquired 
target (Red). He then ”looks” at it and classifies it as alive or dead: if the target is 
classified as alive, he shoots at it only once more. An acquired target is never shot 
at more than twice on a particular occasion. A target that has been shot at twice 
must be reacquired to be classified as being alive or dead; that is, a (hostile) 
target that survives two shots must be reacquired to receive more shots; in the 
meantime it can itself launch weapons, or advance to pursue an advantage. 
An effective BDA capacity can greatly reduce the opponent‘s options and 
effectiveness by increzsing the chance that a targeting mission is successful and 
that this fact is known to the targeter. On the other hand, seriously error-prone 
BDA tends to clog target lists with unprofitable already-dead “targets” that 
vastly hamper the shooter’s response time, hence kill rate, and wastefully inflate 
the expenditure of missile inventory. 
Section 1 describes and presents results for a stochastic queuing network 
model of the situation described. The queuing network model allows closed-form 
calculation of long-run distributional results that are easily turned into numbers 
and graphs without the need for Monte Carlo simulation. It is almost always 
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difficult to obtain mathematically neat closed-form time-dependent results for such 
a queuing model; simulation or numerical calculations are required. Section 2 
presents a deterministic or expected-value approximation to finite server queues 
of the type above. Sections 3 and 4 present deterministic approximations to the 
network queuing model of Section I; the agreement with the mean values of the 
stochastic model tends to be very satisfactory, but no information on state 
fluctuations or risk is available from such models. 
Papers that discuss similar problems and contain further references are 
Almeida, Gaver, and Jacobs (19951, and Gaver and Jacobs (1987); see also Evans 
(1996), Aviv and Kress (to appear) and Manor and Kress (to appear). 
1. An Aggregated Queuing Model of Defensive Targeting when Service 
Success is Assessed with Error, and the Shooting Protocol is Shoot- 
Look-S hoot 
1.1 The Model 
Suppose attackers that are targets for a defensive force appear in region at at 
a constant Poisson rate 2, The time until an unacquired target that is not itself 
firing is detected by a surveillance system is distributed exponentially with mean 
1/5, A live target thai is detected is classified as live and put on the shooter 
servers’ targeting list with probability Rap With probability (1 - &a), it is 
misclassified as dead and returns to the unacquired state. A dead target that has 
not yet been classified as dead is classified as dead when it is acquired with 
probability Rdd and is removed from the system; with probability (I - R d d )  it is 
classified as live, and is erroneously and wastefully put on the targeting list. 
The times between shots by a live Red potential target, such as a TEL ( e g  
SCUD or anti-air missile launcher) are independent identically distributed 
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exponential (Markovian) with mean 1 / a. An unacquired firing target is detected 
and put on the shooter s targeting list with probability PA after it fires. 
A detected target that has been classified as targetable (perhaps 
inappropriately because dead) is viewed as queued and awaiting attention of one 
of s (s = I, 2, . . .) shooters/”servers”; these can be thought of as missile launchers. 
Service times for a shooter can be viewed as realizations of a random variable 
that includes, implicitly, time for the target waiting in the detected queue 
(residing on the target list), conveyed by C4ISR, to be converted to tracking-firing 
information; it also includes time of flight in this model. 
We assume a shooter server uses a shoot-look-shoot protocol. A shot kills a 
target with probability p ~ .  A (possibly erroneous) battle damage assessment 
occurs immediately after the first shot. If the first shot kills the target then, with 
probability Cdd, the target is correctly classified as dead and is appropriately 
ignored from then on; with probability (1 - Cdd) the target is incorrectly classified 
as live and it is shot at once again. If the first shot misses the target, then with the 
probability Cm the target is classified as live and the target is shot at a second 
time; with probability (1 - Cm) the target is misclassified as dead and returns to 
an unacquired state. No battle damage assessment occurs after the second shot; 
the shooter immediately moves to the next enqueued targetable unit. Once a 
dead target is classified as dead it is taken out of the system. 
1.2 Number of Times a Target is Shot At 
In this section we obtc?in expressions for the expected number of times a 
target is shot at with variations in the way the implied question is phrased. 
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1.2.1 Number of times a target that starts as unacquired is shot at while it is 
alive: S u  
1st shot 
kills the 
1st shot &sses the 
target; the target is 
target correctly classified; 
the 2nd shot kills 
the target 
Solving, 
Note that E[SAA]  depends only on p ~ ,  despite the uncertainties of perception 
(Caa < 1); also, the result does not depend on Cdd or Cda = 1 - Cda. The BDA 
process has no influence on this particular measure. 
1.2.2 Number of times a dead target that starts as unacquired is shot at until it is 
classified as dead: SD 
I 
E[SD] = Rdd x 0 + (1 - Rdd) [ l c d d  4- ( I - C d d )  [2+E[SD1]] - + 
prob the prob the shooter shooter 
sensor sensor takes one misdassifies 
correctly incorrectly shot and target after 
classifies classifies correctly 1st shot 
the dead the dead Classifies 
target target target 
Solving 
(1.2.2) 
Note that this does not depend on the true kill probability, p ~ ,  neither does it 
depend on Caa. 
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1.2.3 Number of times a live target that starts as unacquired is shot at until it is 
killed and classified as killed: SAD 
prob target 
IS killed on 
1st shot and 
classified 
as dead 
- - prob target is killed 
on 2nd shot 
prob lulled 
on 1st shot and 
misclassified so 
shot at 2nd time 
- P K ) ( I  - Caa)[l i- ELSAD]] - prob 1st shot prob 1st shot 
msses and tar et misses, target 
correctly classified 
as live and 2nd as dead 
- PK)2cm I;! + E[sAD]] 
misclassifie cg 
shot also misses 
Solving 
(1 -2.3) 
Note that changes in the values of Xdd and Cdd most strongly influence €[SAD] 
through €[SD]. If Cdd = Rlidf then E[SADI is independent of C,. It is clear that the 
capability to correctly identify dead targets as dead is of great importance to 
minimize wasted shots, and (1.2.3) quantifies this dramatically: for small Cdd = 
Rdd, the above reduces to € [ S A D ]  z 1 /PK + 1 / Cdd. 
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1.2.4 Number of times a live target that starts as unacquired is shot at while it is 
dead: SOD 
(1.2.4) 
1.3. Number of Times a Target Passes Through the Surveillance System 
In this section we'obtain expressions for the expected number of times a 
target passes through the surveillance system. 
1.3.1 Number of times a dead target that starts as unacquired passes through the 




dead target after 




(Raa + Cda 1 
if Rdd and Cdd are small. This indicates the extra load imposed by futilely 
processing dead targets. 
1.3.2 Number of times a live target that starts as unacquired passes through the 
surveillance server until it is killed and classified as dead LAD 
Let LAD be the number of times an unacquired live target passes through the 
surveillance server until it is killed and classified as dead. 
6 
target misclaFsified 
detected by sensor 
by sensor 
ki: Prob ed on target 1st shot 
and correctly 
classified 
+R,[I1+ (I-PK) (I-&) €[LAD] 
prob target ?rob target 
not killed 'incorrect1 
Ly--/- 
on 1st shot classifie B 
'Tr; prob shooting 
prob live tar et target is not u t 
is detectej on targetingist 
because it shoots 
7 
Small changes in Rm and P A ,  nuen they are small, can greatly affect €[LAD]. 
Small changes in cad and Rnd can also greatly affect €[LAD] through €[LD] .  
1.3.3 Number of times a live target is acquired before it is killed: L u  
Solving 
1 
Note that small changes in Raa and P A  when they are small can result in non- 
linearly large changes in E [ L u ] .  
We now discuss the queuing model. 
1.4 Mathematical Details of the Queuing Model 
Important operationally relevant questions about the system can be 
addressed in terms of a queuing model. The targets are customers. They are 
either unacquired or queued and awaiting attention of one of s (s = 1,2, ...) 
shooters /"servers". 
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1.4.1 The shooting server 
We will say a target is of type (as, bs) if it requires as shots while it is alive and 
an additional bs shots to classify the dead target as dead. The type of each target 
is independent of the types of other targets. The expected number of shots 
required by a target that has arrived to the region is €[SAD]. The total arrival rate 
of targets to the shooter service system including those that are retargeted is 
aE[SADI - 
Assume the target list queue for the shooters evolves as follows (cf. Kelly 
[ 19791): 
a) Each customer (target) requires an amount of service which is a random 
variable exponentially distributed with unit mean. 
b) A total service (shooting) effort is supplied at the rate 
Y ( &  n) = < 




l=1,2 I . . . ,  s, n=s+l , s+2  ,... ; 
0 otherwise 
(1.4.1) 
d) When a customer arrives at the queue he moves into position t with 
probability 
t = n + l  
otherwise 
y( t ,  n + I) = (1.4.2) 
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when there are n targets waiting or being served. 
The shooter service system behaves as :In M/M/s queue with mean service 
time l/p. 
Let Xs(f )  be the number of targets waiting for service or being served by the 
shooter service system at time t. Corollary 3.4 of Kelly [1979] implies that if As = 




If As > s p  then the effective arrival rate of targets is at least as large as the 
maximum service rate and lim P { X s ( t )  = n} = 0 for n = 0, I, .. . . The servers are 
saturated and the population of unserved targets increases linearly beyond all 
bounds. Henceforth, assume As c p .  
t - w  




The long-run mean queue length at the shooter is 
(1.4.5) 
Both of these expressions reveal the substantial nonlinearity of shooter backlog, 
hence delay: if arrival rate of targets, A, were to increase, backlog skyrockets; but 
a similar and synergistic effect occurs if € [ S A D ]  is high because of incorrect 
classification. The model quantifies the possibly substantial effect of improving 
classification capability on overall targeting performance and can be used to 
study the tradeoff between good classification and traffic handling capability. 
It follows from Theorem 3.1 of Kelly [1979] that the long-run mean number of 
live targets waiting for or receiving service by the shooter is 
(1.4.6) 
The mean number of shooter/servers that are busy is 
r 1 
The mean number of shooter/servers that are serving live targets is 
The long-run mean rate at which live targets are killed is 
(1.4.7) 
(1.4.8) 
P K  = €iSA 1 PPK - 
We wil model the surveillance system similarly but as behaving as an infinite 
server queue with mean service time 1/(5 + a), where a is the rate at which 
targetable opponents reveal themselves by taking offensive action, e.g. shooting 
SCUDS. 
The long-run mean number of undetected targets (both live and dead) is 
(1.4.9) 
1 
E[ (-11 = aE[LAD 1 5+a * 
The long-run mean number of live undetected targets is 
(1.4.1 0) 
From Little’s formula, the mean time it takes to kill a target and classify if as 
dead is 
W = $E[XLHI+ E[Xs(-)]]. (I -4.11) 
The mean time it takes to kill a target is 
The mean number of offensive shots (SCUDS launched) by a Red target is 
~ W A .  All of the above expressions can easily be numerically tabulated; see below. 
Numerical Examples 
In the numerical examples, the arrival rate of targets to the area is 15/hr; the 
rate of target detection by the sensors is { = (1/2)/hr; the rate of firing by a Red 
a= (1/2)/hr; the service rate by a Blue server = 3 per hour; there are 20 Blue 
servers; the PK = 0.5. This is an entirely hypothetical set of numbers and is offered 
only as a very roughly plausible illustration. 
Figure 1.1 presents the average time to kill a Red as a function of PA, the 
probability that a firing Red is put on the targeting list. Increasing PA from 0.1 to 
0.8 reduced the average time to kill a target from over 2 hours to about 1 hour. 
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The average time to classify a dead target as dead is about an hour. The other 
classification probabilities are = 0.5, R d  = 0.7, Caa = 0.5, Cdd = 0.5. 
Figure 1.2 presents the average rate of Red shots per hour as a function of PA. 
Increasing PA from 0.1 to 0.5 reduces the Red shots per hour from about 45 to 30; 
further increases in P A  are less influential unless, say, shooting rate and/or kill 
probability are increased. 
Figure 1.3 displays the mean number of shots fired by a Red target as a 
function of P A  for 2 different values of sensor acquisition rate, 5, one "low" 5 = 
0.5/hr and one "high" 5 = 2/hr. Note that if the sensor acquisition rate is high, 
then the value of PA has little effect. 
Figure 1.4 displays the mean number of Blue shots to kill a Red target and the 
mean number of Blue shots to kill a Red target and classify it as dead as a 
function of Cdd. Since PK = 0.5, the mean number of shots to actually kill a Red 
target is 2. However, the mean number of additional Blue shots expended until a 
dead Red target is classified as dead can be close to 2 for small Cdd (it could 
approach 00 if Rdd were also small) but is negligible for Cdd - 1. Ability to classify 
well is seen to be extremely influential on shooter system efficiency. 
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Figure 1.5 displays the traffic intensity at the shooting service system as Cdd 
varies. A traffic intensity larger than 1 means that the service system is unstable 
and won't be able to handle the work load presented to it. With other parameters 
fixed as shown, the value of Cdd must be close to 0.3 or greater in order for the 
queue to be stable, i.e. not to eventually grow beyond bounds. Even if Cdd = 0.3 
the mean number of targets (both live and dead) waiting or being served at the 
service system will be unacceptably high; the queue, and delay, can be brought 
down quickly and substantially by increasing Cdd. This step also cuts into Red 
effectiveness. 
13 
Figure 1.6 displays the limiting distribution of the number of targets waiting 
for or being served by the shooter-servers (1.4.3). The model parameters are A = 
15, { = 2, a = 0.5, Raa = 0.5, Rdd = 0.6, Caa = 0.5, PA = 0.5, p~ = 0.5, p = 5, s = 10. The 
upper graph displays &z), n = 0, I, ... where Cda = 0.3. The lower graph 
displays xs(n), n = 0, 2, ... where Cad = 0.8. Table 1.1 displays the mean and 




Moments for Limiting Distribution of the Number of 
Targets Waiting or Being Served 
































- Queue is saturated 
The poorer the ability to classify a dead target as dead, (lower Cad), the 
greater the variability in the number of targets waiting or being served by the 
shooter servers. The graph of the limiting distribution with Cad = 0.3 indicates 
that the distribution has a very long and heavy right hand tail; there is a sizable 
probability that more than 100 targets are waiting for service or being served; the 
heavy tail is reflected in the variance of the distribution which is 3543, compared 
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with a mean of 62.3. In comparison, when Cdd = 0.8, the tail of the limiting 
distribution is much shorter; this shorter tail is reflected in a variance of 11.5 
compared to a mean of 7.6. 
2. A Fluid Approximation for the Number of Customers Waiting or 
Being Served in an M/M/s Queue 
Consider an M/M/s queue with Poisson arrivals having rate a, independent 
exponential service tinrLes with mean 1 / p  and s servers. Let N(t)  be the number of 
customers waiting or being served at time f .  Assume A c sp 
A deterministic approximation to (N(t),  t 2 0) is 
Letting t = in (2.1) results in 
La = N(-) = P 
l-($ 
(2.3) 
If s = 1,2, then N(-) is exactly. equal to L, the long run average number of 
customers waiting or being served in a M/M/s queue. Figure 2.1 presents plots 
of ( L  - & ) / L  for the number of servers s = 5,10,20 as a function of A/p Note that 
the approximation La is always less than L Further the approximation becomes 
less exact as the queues' traffic intensity increases. The size of the error also 
increases as the number of servers increases. For 10 servers the approximation is 
at no more than 10% hwer than the true. The approximation appears adequate 





















































0'1 8 0  9'0 Y O  2.0 




0'1 8 0  9'0 c'o Z O  0 0-1 8 0  9'0 c'o 2-0 0 
The approximation with H(f) equal to (2.6) for s = 1 has been proposed by 
Agnew (1976) and Rider (1976); see also Filipiak (1988). 
3. A Deterministic Model for.Defensive Targeting When Service 
Success is Unknown and Shooting Strategy is Shoot-Look-Shoot 
In this section we present a deterministic or expected-value approximation to 
the stochastic queuing network model of Section 1. While this deterministic 
model supplies usefd information about systematic process behavior (e.g. time 
dependencies) it cannot reveal the form of the random variations in targets 
queued for shooting, as in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.6. (Note that in Table 1.1 the 
variance of queue length is approximately (mean queue length)2 for large queue 
length, descending to a variance of queue length nearly equal to the mean queue 
length when the latter is small.) 
Again suppose attackers that are targets for a defensive force appear in region 
cat at a rate A. The time until an unacquired target that is not itself firing is 
detected by a surveillance system is distributed exponentially with mean 1 / 6. A 
live target that is detected is classified as live and put on the shooter servers' 
targeting list with probability R,; with probability (1 - R,) it is misclassified as 
dead and returns to the unacquired state. A dead target that has not yet been 
classified as dead is classified as dead when it is acquired with probability Rdd 
and is removed from the system; with probability (1 - Rdd) it is classified as live, 
and is erroneously put on the targeting list. 
The times between shots by a live target are independent identically 
distributed exponential (Mz-rkovian) with mean 1 /a. An unacquired firing target 
is detected and put on the shooter's targeting list with probability PA. 
A detected target that has been classified as targetable (perhaps 
inappropriately because dead) is viewed as queued and awaiting attention of one 
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of s (s = 1,2, . . .) shooters/”servers”. Service time for a shooter can be viewed as a 
random variable that includes, implicitly, time for target presence in the detected 
queue, conveyed by C4ISR, to be converted to tracking-firing information; it also 
includes time of flight in this model. 
The shooter-server uses a shoot-look-shoot protocol. Parameters are the same 
as before: a shot kills a target with probability p ~ ;  BDA occurs immediately after 
the first shot, so the first shot kills the target then with probability Cdd the target 
is classified as dead and is ignored from then on; with probability (1 - Cdd) the 
target is classified as live and it is shot at again. If the first shot misses the target, 
then with the probability Caa the target is classified as live and the target is shot 
at a second time; with probability (I - Caa) the target is misclassified as dead and 
returns to an unacquired state. No battle damage assessment occurs after the 
second shot; the shooter immediately moves to the next enqueued targetable 
unit. Once a dead target is classified as dead it is taken out of the system. 
3.1 The Effective Arrival Rate of Targets to the Shooter-Server 
Let AdA), (respectively nu@)), be the effective arrival rate of live 
(respectively dead) targets to the undetected state. Let &(A), (respectively A@)), 
be the effective arrival rate of live (respectively dead) targets to the shooter- 
server targeting list for a first shot. Let Al(A), (respectively Al(D)), be the effective 
arrival rate of live (respectively dead) targets put again on the targeting list for a 
second shot. 
The effective arrival rates satisfy the following equations. 
(3.1.1a) 
(3.1.1b) 
(3. I. 1 c) 













3.2 A Deterministic Network Queuing Model Involving Shoot-Look-Shoot 
Consider the following variables. 
A&) = number of undetected live targets at time f 
A&) = number of detected live targets that are on the shooter servers’ 
targeting list and are waiting for the first shot at time f 
Al(f) = number of detected live targets waiting for the second shot at time f 
Ddf) = number of undetected dead targets that have not yet been classified 
as dead at time f 
Do(f) = number of detected dead targets that have not yet been classified as 
dead and are waiting for the first shot 
Dl(f) = number of detected dead targets that have not yet been classified as 
&(f) = Number of Reds killed by time f 
dead and are waiting for the second shot 
K(f) 
R ( f )  
B(f) 
= Number of Reds killed by time f which are classified as dead 
= Number of Red shots by time f 
= Number cf Blue shots by time f 
The variable XS(f) in the stochastic model of Section 1 corresponds to A&) + 
+ Oo(f> + Ol(f>. 




= Rate of arrival of Red attackers to region 
= Rate at which acquired targets are served by a shooter-server 
= Rate at which acquired live targets are lost from track 
a = Rate at which attackers are active 
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5 = Rate at which a target is detected by the defender sensors 
p~ = Probability a live Red target is killed 
C, = Probability shooter classifies a live target as live after shooting 
Cdd = Probability shooter classifies a dead target as dead after shooting 
= Probability a live target is classified as live by a defender sensor 
Rdd = Probability a dead target is classified as dead by a defender sensor 
= Probability an active shooting Red is acquired by the server 
Let 
H(t) is a term to approximzite the behavior of an M/M/s queue (as described in 
Section 2). 
Consider the following deterministic model as an approximation to the 
network of queues model (as described in Section 1). 
dAu(f) = A +" v(Ao(t) + Al(f))  - apAAU(f) - @,AU(t) -- - Y miVal rate rate of loss of active rate of rate of acpsition 
Of targets Reds from track acquisition due to sensors 
dt 
due to Red to area 
activity 
+ $1 - PK)Al ( f )W)  t + $1 - P K ) A O ( w  - C , ) H ( t ]  
t 
active still alive after 2 shots active Red alive after first shot 
misclassified as dead 
classified as alive . actives are shot at 





@l(f)PKH(t) - 541.(f) + @l(W(f) -rate at whch 
dead Red not yet 
classified as dead 
- -. actwe Red hlled on 
2nd shot 
rate at whch 
dead Red not 
et classified as 
by sensor 
&ad is acquired is shot at second time 
(3.2.2d) 
(3.2.2e) 
rate acwhich rate atwhich 
dead Red not yet 
classified as dead 
is acquired b sensor 
dead targets not 
classified as dead 
are shot at 
andclassifi K aslive 
rate at which a live Red is 
killed on 1’‘ shot but is 
misclassfied as live 
-= dR(t) a ( A ~ ( t )  + A&)+ Al(t)) 





3.3 Numerical Results 
Consider a model with the following parameters: A = 15, 5 = 2, a = 0.5, Raa = 
0.5, Rdd = 0.6, Caa = 0.5, PA = 0.5, PK = 0.5, p = 5, s = 10. Table 3.1 displays the long 
run average number of targets waiting or being served by the shooter-servers 
and the long run average number of live targets waiting or being served by the 
shooter-servers as a function of Cdd for the queuing network model of Section 1. 
Also displayed are the values of the total number of targets waiting or being 
served at the shooter servers, Ao(300) + Ai(300) + Do(300) + &(300), as a function 
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of Cad and the long run average number of live targets waiting or being served at 
time 300, Ao(300) + A1(300), for the deterministic model. The deterministic model 
was evaluated using the 4fh/ 5th order Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg method as 
implemented in MATLAB. The agreement is good where both models apply. The 
deterministic model is able to (quickly) estimate the expected number of live 
(opponent) targets at time t (= 300, here) even when the sensor-shooter system is 
saturated. 
Table 3.1 
Targets Waiting or Being Served by the Shooter Servers 
Cdd M/M/10 Deterministic 
Average Number of 
Number of Targets at 
































Average Number of 
Number of Live Targets 













- queuing model is saturated 
4. A Nonstationary Network Queuing Model Involving Shoot-Look- 
Shoot 
Letting A + 0 in the model of Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 will result in AE = 0. The 
function H of 3.2.1 will tend to 1 and the service process will be similar to an 
infinite server queue. 
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Since it is important to model the transient behavior of the system under a 
nonstationary arrival process of targets, we will modify the effective arrival rates 
as follows: 
A1 (01 t )  = h (Dit>[l- c d d ]  + * 







H(t) is a term to approximate the behavior of the M/M/s queue. 
The deterministic model equations of Section 3 remain the same except for 
replacing il by (possibly) A(t) and using H ( f )  of (4.3). 
4.1 Numerical Results 
Consider a model with the following parameters: A = 15, 5 = 2, a = 0.5, Rag = 
0.5, Rdd = 0.6, C, = 0.5, PA = 0.5, p~ = 0.5, p = 5, s = 10. Table 4.1 displays the long 
run average number of targets waiting or being served by the shooter-servers 
and the long run average number of live targets waiting or being served by the 
shooter-servers as a function of C d d  for the queuing network model of Section 1. 
Also displayed are the values of the total number of targets waiting or being 
served at the shooter savers, Ao(1OO) + Al(100) + Do(100) + 01(100), as a function 
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of Cdd and the long run ave-age number of live targets waiting or being served at 
time 100, Ao(100) + A1(100), for the deterministic model of Subsection 4.2. The 
deterministic model was evaluated using the 4th/ 5th order Runge-Kutta- 
Fehlberg method as implemented in MATLAB. Comparison with Table 3.1 
indicates that the deterministic model with effective arrival rate (4.la) - (4.1d) 
and (4.2) gives the same steady state results as the deterministic model of Section 
3 for most cases. The effective arrival rate (4.1a) - (4.ld) and (4.2) is preferable 
cad M/M/10 Deterministic 
Average Number of 
Number of Targets at 
Targets time 300 
since it will allow the deterministic model to gracefully decrease if the arrival 
M/M/10 Deterministic 
Average Number of 
Number of Live Targets 









































- queuing model is saturated 
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5. Summary 
The present paper finds the explicit long-run stochastic behavior for a 
scenario that envisions targets (Red assets) entering a region, being detected and 
targeted. The surveillance rate, probability of correct classification, kill 
probability, and BDA capabilities are all bounded, so targeting is conducted in a 
realistic environment of imperfect and uncertain sensor-shooter system 
performances. Such models permit quick investigation of tradeoffs in system 
element capabilities. The explicit stochastic representation provides insights into 
the ultimate variabilities and uncertainties encountered when detection, 
classification, and BDA are collectively or individually mediocre to poor. Such 
conditions can be induced by effects that are not explicitly modeled here, such as 
Red use of low-value decoys and sophisticated "play dead" tactics by live assets 
that have received plausible (Blue) fire. 
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